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IN THE SUPREI1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The New-Used Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's License, 
DICK and LAVONNE NOREN, dba 
Central R. V. Sales 
Case No. 16521 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner--Respondent seeks affirmance of a decision of 
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, ordering the re-
sponde0t-appellant, Administrator of Motor Vehicle Business Ad-
ministration, to grant the application of petitioner -respondent 
fur a New-Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's License and to duly 
license them under the laws of the State of Utah. Jurisdiction 
was conferred upon the Third District Court according to 
statute providing for an "original action" after appeal from a 
decision of the Administrator denying the application for a 
~ew-~sed Motor Vehicle Dealer's License. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks the affirmance of the Third District 
Court decision ordering the Administrator of Motor-Vehicle 
Business Ad~inistration to forewith grant the application of 
~spondent for a New-Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's License. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 2, 1979, the respondents filed with the 
~otor Vehicle Business Adoinistration Office an application 
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for a New-Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's License with a $20,000.00 
Corporate Surety Bond, and all the building clearances, county 
licenses, building inspection permits, etc., required by statute. 
Furthermore, respondent filed a record of Dick Noren's prior 
conviction record which at that time included convictions for 
the misdemeanor offenses, Failure to Deliver a Certificate of 
Title in 1958 and for Acting as a New-Used Motor Vehicle 
Dealer Without a License in 1977. 
On January 28, 1979 the Administrator of the Motor 
Vehicle Business Administration notified respondent, Dick Noren, 
of his intent to deny respondent the requested license specif-
ically listing as the reason for his action the two prior con-
victions. On March 12, 1979, a hearing was held before the Ad-
visory Board of the Utah State Vehicle Business Administration, 
and on March 15, 1979, the Advisory Board recommended the Ad-
ministrator deny respondent the license. The Administrator 
adopted the Advisory Board's findings of fact and ordered that 
no Motor Vehicle Dealer's License be issued. (TR. 16) 
On April 10, 1979, the Honorable Raymond F. Uno granted 
Mr. Noren's motion to set aside his convictions and to dismiss 
and to discharge them pursuant to Section 77-35-17, Utah Cod~ 
Annotated, (1953). 
The respondent, on April 16, 1979, pursuant to 41-3-26, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953), appealed the decision of the Ad-
ministrator and petitioned the court for an original action 
(TR 2). 
The Administrator sought summary judgment before the 
- 2 -
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Law and Motion Judge for the Third District Court. An affi-
davit was filed to contest the summary judgment motion, argu-
ments were heard, and thereafter the motion to grant summary 
judgment was denied (TR. 12). The matter then proceeded to 
trial. On May 31, 1979, the Third District Court issued 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered the Adminis-
trator of the Motor Vehicle Business Administration to grant 
respondent's the license that they originally sought. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN HOLDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL CON-
VICTIONS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SET 
ASIDE BY THE CONVICTING COURT, THE ACTIONS 
DISMISSED AND THE RESPONDENT DISCHARGED 
PURSUANT TO §77-35-17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953 AS AMENDED), WERE NOT ADMISSABLE AS 
"CONVICTIONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MOTOR 
VEHICLE ACT" UNDER §41-3-8 (3) (a) AND (b). 
It is submitted that §77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) is an "expungement" statute, which restores 
the criminal offender to his status quo ante thereby removing 
all evidence and the very existence of the prior conviction. 
§77-35-17 provides that the Court may upon its own 
motion, "terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty 
or conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the action and dis-
charge the defendant." This Court has twice stated that the 
effect of the statute is to "expunge" the record of a con-
viction. See State v. Schrieber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222 
(1952); State v. Chambers, 533 P. 2d 876, 878 (1975). 
- 3 -
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Mr. Justice Maughan in Chambers, at 878, wrote as follows: 
"The word 'expunge' properly describes a physical act not a 
legal one, (footnoting to Schriber, supra). However, in 
relation to §77-35-17, it has become fastened in our law by 
decision and practice as descriptive of what the Court can do 
under that statute. 
revoke, set aside." 
In this sense, it is expressive of cancel, 
Other authorities certainly concur with Mr. Justice 
Maughan's statement. In LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED,Kerper 
Kerper (1974) "the word expungement means to erase. The purpose 
of expungement statutes is to erase a criminal record as if it 
never happened in the first place." 
In State v. Miller, 520 P.2d 1248, 1253 (1974) the Kansas 
Supreme Court said: "It may be stated that annulment of con-
viction statutes, often called expungement statutes, do not 
merely lift disabilities resulting from conviction and restore 
civil rights; they have the legal effect of restoring the reformed 
offender to his status quo existing prior to the conviction." 
See also, U.S. v. MacLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1967) 
wherein the 5th Circuit Court ordered the District Court to ex-
punge the record and to "return the individuals to their status 
quo ante." 
In Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of 
Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 Wash. L.Q. 
147, 149, it was observed, "It is rather a redefinition of status, 
a process of erasing the legal event of a conviction or ad-
judication, and thereby restoring to the regenerate offender the 
- 4 -
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Another authority states "expunge" means "to obliterate 
or to make void and of no effect." Expungement of Criminal Con-
victions in Kansas: A Necessary Rehabilitative Tool, 13 washburn 
L.H., 93, 94. 
The appellant argues in Point I that §77-35-17, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended), does not "obliterate the record." 
In so doing he relies on certain dicta in State v. Chambers, supra, 
upon an observation of the authors of Legal Rights of the Con-
victed, relating to the admission of charactor evidence before an 
administrative body and two California cases upholding adminis-
trative license revocations. 
In State v. Chambers, supra, the Court in addressing 
itself to the appellant's argument that Section 77-35-17.5 im-
pliedly repealed or amended Section 77-35-17, distinguished the 
two statutes saying: "Proceeding under this statute the Court 
cannot seal the record, restrict its inspection, nor bring into 
operation circumstances which would allow response to inquires 
relating to a conviction of crime, as though the conviction 
never occurred (all of which were statutorily provided for in 
§77-35-17. 5). The Court can terminate the sentence, set aside a 
defendant's plea of guilty, the conviction , dismiss the action 
and discharge the defendant. The Court can also direct that 
copies of the order be dispatched to appropriate agencies--this 
the Court can do in aid of its order, that it may have its intended 
effect." 
It is submitted that the distinctions between the two 
- 5 -
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statutes cited by the Court do not therefore require that the 
evidence of the convictions (which have been "cancelled, revok~ 
and set aside") was admissable before the trial court. Rather 
is is submitted that the distinctions cited are largely a matter 
of procedure with the same resultant effect. That is to say that 
although the respondent herein, after the expunging of his con-
victions under §77-35-17, may not answer as he could under §77-
35-17.5 that he had never been convicted of the offenses in 
question, he could nevertheless answer truthfully, that although 
he had been convicted of the offenses, that the convicting court 
had set aside the conviction, had dismissed the action and had 
discharged him and that therefore his conviction(s) do not now 
exist. On analysis, although there are procedural differences 
between the two statutes as to how the "physical act" of ex-
pungement is achieved, there seems to this writer to be only 
one basic difference between the statutes, this relating to the 
"secrecy protection" afforded under §77-35-17.5, which was 
obviously intended by the Legislature to hamper discovery of 
the "expunged conviction" by an inquiry to the public record. 
(although the Court could, by ordering the appropriate agencies 
to return all documents, etc., relating to the conviction, 
accomplish a practical "sealing" of the records). The re-
spondent herein, does recognize that difference between the 
statutes. However, it is submitted that it does not follow that 
as appellant argues, that since the conviction is discoverable 
by inquiry to the public record or through the testimony of 
- 6 -
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he respondent himself, that the conviction is therefore admiss-
able as herein even though the conviction has been set aside, 
dismissed and the respondent discharged therefrom. 
As to the appellant's citation to the 1974 Kerper & 
Kerper book, Legal Rights of the Convicted,for the proposition 
that "expunged convictions" are admissable as "character evidence" 
before an administrative tribunal who have not been confined to 
the rules of evidence, arguing therefrom that the trial court 
herein who obtained its original jurisdiction by the same statute 
should therefore not be confined to its own rules of evidence. 
Arguments relating to the original jurisdiciton issue will be 
presented more fully in a later Point. It is submitted, however, 
that the very nature of the trial court's jurisdiction distin-
guishes its procedural rules from that available to an admin-
istrative tribunal and it is argued therefore that the court's 
rules of evidence would not allow admission of the expunged 
conviction as it does not now exist. 
The appellant cites to two California cases, Meyer v. 
Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Calif. 2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949) 
and In Re Phillips, 17 Calif. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344, (1941), as 
specific examples wherein courts have upheld license revocations 
or denials "despite the fact that the basis for the denials 
(criminal convictions) were pardoned or set aside." (Appellant 
cited both cases as Colo(rado) cases in his brief--Respondent has 
concluded that this was merely a typographical error and not an 
attempt to mislead the court). It is submitted that both of the 
- 7 -
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cases are so distinguishable from the instant cases so-as-to make 
them valueless as precedent in this case. 
In In Re Phillips, supra, the California court upheld the 
disbarrment of an attorney whose sentence had been "lifted" by 
serving a probationary term. The case did not, as herein, 
involve the statutory "expungement" of a conviction, but rather 
only the serving of a term of probation. Respondent agrees with i 
the legal proposition announced in In Re Phillips, supra, but 
submits that because it does not purport to deal with expungement 
of a conviction, it has no precedent value herein. 
In Meyer v. Bd. of Examiners, supra, the California court 
upheld the doctor's medical license revocation, even though the 
conviction was set aside following a probationary period. The 
doctor had argued that the (California) law announced in People 
v. MacKay, 203 p. 135, 138 (Calif. 1922) which had interpreted 
the then existing "expungement statute" "to place the defendant 
in a position which he would have occupied in all respects as a 
citizen if no accusation or information had ever been presented 
against him." The respondent countered and the court so held 
that the very statute upon which the doctor relied for setting 
aside of his conviction was not an "expungement" statute (as 
herein) in that it had an expressed proviso that .... "makes t~ 
conviction (although set aside) to count against the defendant 
under prior conviction statutes (similar to our Habitual 
Criminal statute) or if it is offered for impeachment 
purposes in a subsequent prosecution." Meyer, 206 P.2d at 
- 8 -
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1088. The court expressly held that the statute involved 
therein was not an "expungement type statute" as herein, State 
v. Chambers, supra, and therefore is not precedent herein. 
Furthermore, the Meyers rationale is not now the state of the law 
in California that same having been repudiated in Loder v. 
Municipal Court for S.D. Jud. Dist., 553 P.2d 624, 635 (Calif 1976) 
which prohibited "the prior practice whereby the State and local 
agencies denied or revoked a business or professional license 
on the ground that a record of arrest or conviction demonstrated 
lack of good moral character." 
The respondent submits that Hr. Justice Maughan's majority 
opinion in State v. Chambers, supra, has definitively ruled that 
§77-35-17 is an expungement type statute and that the respondent 
herein has therefore been restored to his status quo ante. 
However, in the event this Court sees fit to re-examine this 
proposition, the respondent mades the following argument in favor 
of the Chambers position. 
In a problem of statutory interpretation, the Court should 
look to the purpose for which a statute is enacted to determine 
if is is applicable in a given situation. Young v. Barney, 
433 P. 2d 846 (Utah 1967). In Rowley v. Public Service Comm., 
185 P.2d 514, 521 (Utah 1947) this Court stated that where the 
words are not explicit, the legislative intention is to be 
collected. . "from the occasion and necessity of the laws from 
the mischief felt and the remedy in view. 
In this regard it is argued that the major reason a person 
- 9 -
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would have his record expunged is to renew his opportunity for 
employment or professional licensing. Expungement in Ohio, 
Assimilation into Society for the Former Criminal, 8 Akron Law 
Review 480, 490 (1975). To interpret §77-35-17, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) as appellant herein argues would be 
to remove from the statute the very purpose and remedy it was 
intended to provide. If that were not the legislative intent, 
the legislature could have, as California did in the Meyers v. 
Bd. of Medical Examiners, supra, situation specifically provided 
that the remedy provided by §77-35-17 did not apply to licensing 
situations. That the Utah Legislature did not so provide is 
further argument for respondent's position herein. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has analyzed the situation 
argued herein in holding the Kansas expungement statute was en-
acted for the purpose of relieving offenders from 
the social and economic stigma resulting 
from criminal convictions and to offer them 
an added incentive to conform to social norms 
and to participate in our society without the 
added burden of a criminal conviction. An 
annulment of conviction (expungement type) 
statute is an aid to an ex-offender in recog-
nition of the fact that ex-offenders need the 
understanding and respect of others--not their 
scorn and ill will. Such statutes are based 
on the philosophy that fallen men can rise 
again and should be helped to do so. 
The Miller Court also noted that employment "perhaps as 
much as anything else influences a man's concept of himself and 
his worth, and accordingly influences the values which guide his 
conduct." See also Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication 
10 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ ... , supra, at 153. 
It is submitted that only by interpreting §77-35-17 as 
wiping out the record of the conviction and returning the 
offender to his status quo ante is the purpose sought to be 
accomplished by the act fulfilled. The statute itself lays 
down specific procedural guidelines before an offender's record 
may be expunged, which includes the offender proving to a judge 
of the convicting court that he has proved himself deserving and 
ready to re-enter society. It should further be noted that these 
procedural guidelines clearly include an appeal from the decision 
of the convicting court to "expunge" if the court acted in excess 
of its discretionary powers. It is further noteworthy that no 
such appeal was pursued by the appellant herein. It is there-
fore submitted that the legislative purpose in enacting §77-35-17 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), should be recognized and 
this Court should uphold the decision of the court below. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANT-
ING JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT IN AS MUCH AS 
SECTION 41-3-26 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) 
PROVIDES FOR AN ORIGINAL ACTION, WHICH IS A 
TRIAL de NOVO, AND THE APPELLANT WAS UNABLE 
TO PRESENT ANY EVIDE'"CE OF A VALID CONVICTION 
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE. 
Section 41-3-27, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), provides 
that "Should the applicant for a license or a license holder 
desire to appeal from the decision of the Administrator, he 
shall, ... file an original action in the District Court, ... 
This law was first enacted in 1943. Two years prior to 
- 11 -
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its enactment, this court defined "original jurisdiction" as 
found in the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 7. In 
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941) this court considered the 
question of whether the Utah Constitution required all criminal 
actions be first brought at the District Court level or whether 
the action may be brought upon appeal, according to the atatutory 
plan, from an inferior court. The Utah Supreme Court states: 
Original jurisdiction as contradistin-
guished is the right to hear the cause, to 
make its own determination of the issues from 
the evidence as submitted directly by the 
witnesses; or of the law as presented, unin-
fluenced or unconcerned or limited by any prior 
determination, or the action of any other 
court juridically determining the same contro-
versy. Original jurisdiction as here used 
means the right of the court to make its own 
record , its own finding and determination. An 
original determination is one previously made. 
It is original in the sense that it stands 
alone upon its own base, not the outgrowth of 
some other. State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d at 1037. 
See also, Hakke v. Faux, 396 P.2d 867 (1964). 
The Court further noted that the "purpose and effect of 
a trial de Novo on appeal was the invoking of original, as 
distinguished from appellate jurisdiction," Johnson,ll4 P.2d 
at 1037. Aside or as part of the definition of original 
jurisdiction, the Court defined an "original judgment" and an 
original hearing" as follows: 
Each judgment of the district court when first 
entered after trial is an original judgment, 
even though the cause may have been previously 
tried and a new trial granted. Each hearing 
which starts from "scratch" and permits the 
parties to produce all available proper evidence 
on all of the issues is an original hearing 
- 12 -
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before the court,--one unfettered, un-
limited, or unconfined by the hearing had 
before any other court or tribunal. (emphasis 
added) State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d at 1038. 
Other courts and authorities have likewise defined an 
"original action" or a "trial de Novo" as requiring a new 
trial, where the evidence is heard "as if it had never been 
heard before," in accordance with the traditional understanding. 
See 2. Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 698, 597. The 
definition of a classic de Novo review was stated by the Arizona 
Supreme Court in Herzberg v. State Ex Rel. Humphrey, 513 P.2d 
966.969 (Arizona 1973). 
When we consider a de Novo review without 
statutory limitations of any kind, that is, 
a classic de Novo reconsideration, the pro-
ceeding loses most of its character as a 
review, and is heard the same as though it 
were an original proceeding upon evidence in-
troduced in the reviewing court, and with the 
reviewing court making an entirely independent 
determination unfettered by presumptions 
created by the decision of the administrative 
agency. 
Appellant cites an Arizona case, Sulgar v. Arizona 
Corp Commission, 423 P.2d 145 {Arizona 1967) as authority for 
interpreting a de Novo hearing required by statute more narrowly 
(see brief of Appellant at 14). In Herzberg, 513 P.2d at 969, 
the Arizona Supreme Court noted that the limited scope of review 
required in Sulgar was applicable only when the statute ex-
plicitly granted a de Novo review and placed other restrictions 
upon the scope of review. It should be noted that the Arizona 
Supreme Court, interpreting the Arizona licensing statutes has 
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found the statutes require a "classic de Novo reconsideration." 
Herzberg, 513 P.2d at 969. In the present case the statute 
merely provides for an "original action" and does not contain 
any further restrictions on the scope of review. Therefore, 
the standard applied in Herzberg is applicable to the present 
case and requires a de Novo hearing. 
The other cases cited by appellant to support the argu-
ment that a very narrow interpretation of a de Novo hearing is 
required are distinguishable on their facts because these cases 
concern the scope of review where a de Novo hearing was not 
required by a statute. Furthermore, appellant fails to dis-
tinguish the cases upon whether the administrative agency acted 
in a quasi-judicial or a legislative fashion. See 2 AM Jur 
2d, Administrative Law, See 699, 600. The latter distinction 
will be discussed infra. Central Bank and Trust Co. v Brimhall, 
497 P.2d 638 (Utah 1972) and Denver and Rio Grande Western 
v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, 287 P.2d 884 
(Utah 1955) are both cases where statutes did not grant a trial 
de Novo or "original action" upon appeal from the administrative 
agency. See Denver and Rio Grande Western Co. v. Central 
Weber Sewer, 287 P.2d 887 wherein the court stated, "nor do we 
agree with the utilities that the act contemplates a trial de 
Novo." Appellant cites Denver and Rio Grand Western for the 
proposition that a trial de Novo is appropriate only in limited 
circumstances. Clearly, this is correct where the statute 
itself does not grant one. The United States Supreme Court 
- 14 -
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cases cited in appellant's brief, Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe,401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct. 814 and Camp v. Pitts, 
411 R.S. 138 13 S. Ct. 814 (1971) are to the same effect. 
Indeed, these cases concern the scope of review from an informal 
administrative hearing where traditionally the scope of review 
has been most limited. See 3 Davis, Administrative Law, 
§16.09, 330, 331. See also,Nat'l Coal Operators Assn. v. Kleppe, 
423 U.S. 388 (1976), noting that a de Novo hearing must be 
granted where the statute in question has provided for one. 
United States v. District Court, 238 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951) 
did involve a statute that provided for a trial de Novo. At 
page 1135 this Court held that the district court could not 
declare any rights or decide any issue that the administrator, 
under the terms of the statute, could not. It seems undeniable 
that in the present case when the court below decided the issue 
of whether there was any evidence the respondent had ever been 
convicted, he was deciding the same issue as that decided by 
the Administrator. This court at 1135, further stated, "The 
trial in the district court should be a trial de Novo, and limited 
to the particular question decided by the state engineer. Of 
course this does not mean that the evidence in the case or the 
decision of the district court would be the same as that of 
the engineer." 
The final argument raised by appellant for refusing to 
give to 41-3-26, Utah Code Annotated, the clear meaning the words 
"original action" show the legislature intended, (See Salt Lake 
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City, Salt Lake County, 433 P.2d 846, 20 Utah 2d 108 (1967) ), is 
based on Article V Sec. 1 of the Utah Constitution, which 
requires that the Utah Courts perform only "judicial functions." 
However, a court of law, engaged in finding facts and applying 
law, is engaged in the very essence of the judicial function. 
See Francisco v. Bd. of Directors of Bellevue Public Schools 537 
P.2d 789 (Wash. 1975). It is only when the administrative agency 
is exercising "discretion" given to the agency by the legislatun, 
that a court is barred by the separation of powers or functions 
doctrine from acting de Novo. 3 Davis Administrative Law, 
542, §29.09. It is relevant that the United States Supreme 
Court when interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 
U.S.C.A. §701 (a) ,stated that the "committed to agency discretion 
exception to judicial review is applicable in those rare in-
stances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a 
given case there is no law to apply." Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
Appellant is basically arguing that a de Novo review of an 
administrative agency is per se unconstitutional. He cites no 
authority to support his point. Indeed, the holding of Peterson 
vs Livestock Comm., 181 P.2d 152, 156, (Mont. 1947), from which 
appellant quotes extensively, was that the District Court was 
correct in reversing the Commission as a matter of law, and it 
was not a matter of agency "discretion." 
If the administrative agency is engaged in a quasi-
judicial function, "according to the subject matter of the adrnin-
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istrative review confronting the court in a particular case," 
(emphasis added) Floyd v. Department of Labor and Industries, 
269 P.2d 563, 568 (Wash. 1954), a trial de Novo is not uncon-
stitutional as an attempt to delegate a legislative function. 
As stated by the Washington Supreme Court in Floyd, 269 P.2d 
at 56 8: 
It is apparent both from the decided cases and 
from the text books that the scope of judicial 
review of the actions of administrative agencies 
does vary with the subject matter of the review 
or the function of the agency. Prentis v. 
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 
67, 53 L.ed 150; Crowell v. Benson, 285 u.s. 23, 
52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L.ed. 598; Uhler, Review of 
Administrative Acts, 178. 
To support appellant's position, it would have to be 
shown that the Aministrator Has acting legislatively, not quasi-
JUdicially, when he ruled, solely on the basis of section 41-3-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) and his findings of fact, that 
appellant should be denied a license. The Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 u.s.c. §551, defines "adjudication" to include 
licensing. 
The tests for determining whether the Administrator is 
acting in a judicial or legislative manner are stated in Floyd 
v. Department of Labor Industries, and Francisco v. Bd. of 
Directors, 537 P.2d 789, 792 (Wash. 1975). The Court in 
Francisco, at 793 stated "a judicial inquiry investigates, de-
clares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past 
facts and under laws supposed already to exist." See also 
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Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S. Ct 
67,69 (1908) and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 
u.s. 441 (1915). The determination of whether appellant had 
ever been "convicted" is a past fact and the effect of 41-3-8 
and 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated, are assuredly, statutes in 
existence. Another test laid down in Francisco is that a 
"judicial function resembles what courts customarily do." 
See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treaties, 390, 395 §24.02. Under 
this test the court in Francisco determined the administrator acts 
quasi-judicially when he is "required to investigate facts, 
or ascertain the existence of a fact." Black's Law Dictionary 
(4th ed 1968). In the present case, the entire basis of the 
Administrator's decision was a finding of fact. In light of the 
actual issue involved in the present case, no discretionary or 
legislative functions can be found to have been thrust upon the 
District Court; therefore, no constitutional question of 
delegation of functions arises. 
The Administrator based his decision entirely on the 
existence of records of convictions. In the "original action" 
or trial de Novo, the decision of the district court had to be 
based on evidence introduced before the court. The Administrator 
had the burden of coming forward with evidence of any record 
of a conviction. He could not rely on his own findings of fact 
as "evidence" to support his contention. 
refused; none was submitted. 
- 18 -
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The expungement statute, 77-35-17 Utah Code Annotated, 
does have the effect of wiping out "canceling, revoking, setting 
aside," the record. See State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 
878 (Utah 1975). The petitioner, having shown the record had 
been expunged, thereby further proved the nonexistence of a 
record of conviction and that no record of conviction could be 
proved to have existed. The findings of fact the District Court 
makes must be supported by evidence introduced at the trial de 
Novo. The appellant simply did not and could not support his 
contention that appellant had ever been convicted, and, therefore, 
the court below was correct in a ruling as a matter of law for 
the Respondent. 
POINT III 
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDING BELOW WAS A 
TRIAL DE NOVO OR MERELY A REVIEW OF THE 
RECORD, THE DISTRICT COURT COULD HEAR NEW 
EVIDENCE IF HE THOUGHT "JUSTICE REQUIRED" 
UNDER RULE 65 B, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
AND REVERSE THE ADMINISTRATOR"S DECISION. 
In Denver and R.G.W.R. Co. v Central Water Denver, 287 
P.2d 884, 886 (Utah 1955) the Utah Supreme Court held that even 
where the statute does not provide for a trial de Novo, the 
court may receive, examine and weigh evidence. In Peatross 
v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 281, 284 
(Utah 1976) this court held that a review of an administrative 
agency is by extraordinary writ, under Rule 65 B. This court 
further noted that Rule 65 B is "in the nature of a proceeding 
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in equity," and that the District Court "could take evidence 
if it thought that the interests of justice so required. 
See Denver and R.G.W.R. Co. v. Central Weber Imp. Dist., " 
Peatross 555 P.2d at 284. See also Child v. Salt Lake City, 
Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978). 
The above cited cases establish that the court below was 
acting within his discretion in hearing the evidence that res-
pendent's record had been expunged. Appellant denies that the 
reviewing court could take into consideration a change of under-
lying facts citing Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 392 P.2d 
672 (Utah 1964); and Peterson v. Livestock Comm., 181 P.2d 152 
(Mont. 1947). The courts in both cases held that an adminis-
trative agency cannot find an applicant ineligible for a license 
or a lease upon the basis of a statutory amendment to the ad-
ministrative scheme that has not yet taken effect. This holding 
would be applicable in the present case only if the statute in 
question, 41-3-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953), had been amended 
with an effective date in the future and one of the parties, 
upon appeal, was arguing for the application of the amendment. 
Appellant in his brief argues that if the court below 
was engaged in a trial de Novo, then he was correct in reversing 
the Adr:1inistrator, otherwise the court was bound to uphold the 
Administrator (See Appellant's Brief at 9). The latter argument, 
that the court could not reverse the Administrator upon review 
after hearing the evidence of a change in the underlying facts, is 
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incorrect. The Administrator based his decision upon the ex-
istence of the convictions. The court ruled as a matter of law 
that the effect of 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) was to 
remove the convictions and any evidence of them and to return 
respondent to his status quo ante, therefore, he was no longer 
"convicted" under terms of 41-3-8 (3) (a), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) . 
An administrative determination of a question of law is 
not binding upon the reviewing court. In review of the deter-
mination, the court may exercise independent judgment, 2. Am. 
Jur 2d §626, 555. The appellant points to the language of 
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 497 P.2d at 641. Mixed 
questions of law and fact are often treated as a question of 
law by the court where no special latitude is given the Ad-
ministra tor. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law §670, 539, 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §30.05, 551. 
The determination of the effect of 77-35-17, Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953) is a matter of statutory construction and deter-
mination of law. It does not call for the expertise of the 
agency. The court is the expert on matters of statutory inter-
~etation. State v. The Aleut Corporation,54l P.2d 730, 
(Alaska 1975) FCC v RCA Communications,346 u.s. 86, 73 S. Ct 
998 (1953). In Muklak Freight Lines, Inc. v. Nabors Alaska 
Drilling, Inc., 516 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1973) the Alaska Supreme 
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Court stated: 
The controlling factors in this case weigh 
heavily against application of the reasonable 
basis test to the issues now under considera-
tion. Those issues appear to have little to do 
with the Commission's expertise or particular-
ized knowledge. Instead they concern consti-
tutional and statutory interpretations requiring 
the special competency of the courts. 
See also 3 Davis, Administrative Law, §30.06, 552 noting that 
the courts, and not the agencys, are the experts on matters of 
common law, statutory interpretation, and "problems transcend-
ing the particular field of the agency." 
The court in the present case did not need to give de-
ference to a finding of fact of the Administrator. The court 
determined the effect of the expungement statute, 77-35-17, Utah 
Code Annotated upon the facts as existed before the Administrator. 
In holding as a matter of law that 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated, 
removed the fact of the convictions and that there was no longer 
any record to support finding a "conviction" under 41-3-8 (3) 
(a), Utah Code Annotated, the court was entirely within its 
authority and could make an independent judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court ruled correctly in overturning the de-
cision of the Administrator to deny the license in question, the 
prior decision being based on the prior convictions of respon-
dent which were "expunged" by the convicting court in the interiUJn· 
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The trial court's decision was correct whether the "original 
action" was in the nature of a trial de Novo or a review of 
administrative decision. Respondent asks this court to affirm 
the trial courts decision to grant the license in question to 
respondent. 
Respectfully submitted this day of 
1980. 
DAVID M. BOWN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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